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A Multinomial Probit Model of Stochastic Evolution.

Abstract:

A strategy revision process in symmetric normal form games is proposed. Following Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), members of a population periodically revise their strategy choice, and choose a myopic best response to currently observed play. Their payoffs are perturbed by normally distributed Harsanyian (1973) trembles, so that strategies are chosen according to multinomial probit probabilities. As the variance of payoffs is allowed to vanish, the graph theoretic methods of the earlier lit...

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Authors


David P. Myatt More by this author
Chris Wallace More by this author
Volume:
90
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2002
URN:
uuid:76730591-4854-4c6b-aba7-1bcb5711432e
Local pid:
ora:1127
Language:
English

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