Epistemic norms, closure, and No-Belief hinge epistemology

Journal article

Recent views in hinge epistemology rely on doxastic normativism to argue that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are not beliefs. This paper has two aims; the first is positive: it discusses the general normative credentials of this move. The second is negative: it delivers two negative results for No-Belief hinge epistemology such construed. The first concerns the motivation for the view: if we’re right, doxastic normativism offers little in the way of theoretical support for the claim that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are anything but garden-variety beliefs. The second concerns theoretical fruitfulness: we show that embracing a No-Belief view will either get us in serious theoretical trouble, or loose all anti-sceptical appeal

Authors: Simion, M; Schnurr, J; Gordon, E

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Springer
• Journal: Synthese
• Volume: 198
• Issue: S15
• Pages: 3553-3564
• Publication date: 2019-03-02
• DOI: 10.1007/s11229-019-02165-1
• EISSN: 1573-0964
• ISSN: 0039-7857
• Language: English
• Keywords: Philosophy of science; Skepticism; Epistemology; Philosophy of language; Political science; Normative; Closure (psychology); Appeal; Variety (cybernetics); Doxastic logic; Computer science; Philosophy; Law; Metaphysics