Working paper
Time inconsistent environmental policy and optimal delegation
- Abstract:
-
Time consistency problems can arise when environmental taxes are employed to encourage firms to take irreversible abatement decisions. Setting a high carbon tax, for instance, would induce firms to invest in low-carbon technology, yet once investment has occurred the government can then reduce the carbon tax to better achieve other objectives; lower energy prices, redistribution, and electoral success. The resulting time inconsistency discourages firms from investing in the first place. We pr...
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- Publication status:
- Published
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- University of Oxford
- Series:
- Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
- Publication date:
- 2003-10-01
- Paper number:
- 175
Item Description
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
1144263
- Local pid:
-
pubs:1144263
- Deposit date:
-
2020-12-15
Terms of use
- Copyright date:
- 2003
- Rights statement:
- Copyright 2003 The Author(s)
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