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The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game

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APA Style

Fotakis, D., Kontogiannis, S., Koutsoupias, E., Mavronicolas, M., & Spirakis, P. (2009). The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game. Theor. Comput. Sci., 410(36), 3305–3326.

MLA Style

Fotakis, D., et al. “The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game.” Theor. Comput. Sci., vol. 410, no. 36, 2009, pp. 3305–26.

Chicago Style

Fotakis, D, S Kontogiannis, E Koutsoupias, M Mavronicolas, and P Spirakis. 2009. “The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game.” Theor. Comput. Sci. 410 (36): 3305–26.
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Authors

+ Fotakis, D More by this author

Role:: Author

+ Kontogiannis, S More by this author

Role:: Author

+ Koutsoupias, E More by this author

Role:: Author

+ Mavronicolas, M More by this author

Role:: Author

+ Spirakis, P More by this author

Role:: Author

Journal:: Theor. Comput. Sci. More from this journal
Volume:: 410
Issue:: 36
Pages:: 3305-3326
Publication date:: 2009-01-01

UUID:: uuid:723e0154-67ae-44d2-9f89-2d28dc09ade0
Local pid:: cs:7913
Deposit date:: 2015-03-31

Terms of use

Copyright date:: 2009

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

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