Desire-fulfilment and consciousness

Journal article

I show that there are good reasons to think that some individuals without any capacity for consciousness should be counted as welfare subjects, assuming that desire-fulfilment is a welfare good and that any individuals who can accrue welfare goods are welfare subjects. While other philosophers have argued for similar conclusions, I show that they have done so by relying on a simplistic understanding of the desire-fulfilment theory. My argument is intended to be sensitive to the complexities and nuances of contemporary developments of the theory, while avoiding highly counter-intuitive implications of previous arguments for the same conclusion.

Authors: Mogensen, AL

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Springer
• Journal: Philosophical Studies
• Volume: 183
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 511-529
• Publication date: 2025-12-20
• Acceptance date: 2025-11-12
• DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02455-0
• EISSN: 1573-0883
• ISSN: 0031-8116
• Language: English
• Keywords: Desire; Moral standing; Consciousness; Well-being; Emotion