Working paper
Sophisticated Play by Idiosyncratic Agents.
- Abstract:
-
The payoffs of a symmetric 2x2 coordination game are perturbed by agent-specific heterogeneity. Individuals observe a (possibly sampled) history of play, which forms the initial hypothesis for an opponent's behaviour. Seedings beliefs in this manner, they iteratively reason toward a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Realised actions augment history and context evolves. Both risk-dominance and generalised risk-dominance determine equilibrium selection as heterogeneity vanishes. When sampling is suffi...
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Nuffield College (University of Oxford)
- Series:
- Economics Working Papers
- Publication date:
- 1999-01-01
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- UUID:
-
uuid:6eb22624-ac84-4d66-98eb-6b81432be3a9
- Local pid:
- oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:11938
- Deposit date:
- 2011-08-16
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- Copyright date:
- 1999
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