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Sophisticated Play by Idiosyncratic Agents.

Abstract:

The payoffs of a symmetric 2x2 coordination game are perturbed by agent-specific heterogeneity. Individuals observe a (possibly sampled) history of play, which forms the initial hypothesis for an opponent's behaviour. Seedings beliefs in this manner, they iteratively reason toward a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Realised actions augment history and context evolves. Both risk-dominance and generalised risk-dominance determine equilibrium selection as heterogeneity vanishes. When sampling is suffi...

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Series:
Economics Working Papers
Publication date:
1999
URN:
uuid:6eb22624-ac84-4d66-98eb-6b81432be3a9
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:11938
Language:
English

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