Book section : Chapter
Importance, Fame, and Death
- Abstract:
- Some people want their lives to possess importance on a large scale. Some crave fame, or at least wide recognition. And some even desire glory that will only be realised after their death. Such desires are either ignored or disparaged by many philosophers. However, although few of us have a real shot at importance and fame on any grand scale, these can be genuine personal goods when they meet certain further conditions. Importance that relates to positive impact and reflects our agency answers a distinctive existential concern for one's life to matter. And since what is important merits wide appreciation, the step from wanting to be significant and wanting that significance widely appreciated is small. Still, desires for importance and fame can take a more vicious character when they are not properly structured, and when they are not dominated by more impartial aims. If we accept the personal value of importance and fame, it is hard to see why that value cannot extend beyond our death. The temporal distribution of glory is actually irrelevant to its value. But it is also a mistake to identify a concern with posthumous glory with the wish to leave a trace after our death.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, 252.0KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1017/S1358246121000229
- Publisher:
- Cambridge University Press
- Host title:
- Death and Meaning
- Volume:
- 90
- Pages:
- 33-55
- Publication date:
- 2021-11-16
- DOI:
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Subtype:
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Chapter
- Pubs id:
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1237536
- Local pid:
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pubs:1237536
- Deposit date:
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2022-02-05
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors
- Copyright date:
- 2021
- Rights statement:
- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2021.
- Notes:
-
This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available from Cambridge University Press at https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246121000229
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