Journal article
Being rational about radical environmentalism: a response to Simpson and Handfield
- Abstract:
- Robert Simpson and Toby Handfield recently argued in this journal that my epistemic environmentalism is too radical. It implausibly collapses the distinction between rational response to evidence and group epistemic success and – on the mistaken assumption that this best conduces to epistemic success – requires uncritical deference to apparent experts. In this response, I argue that Simpson and Handfield badly mischaracterize my view. I neither collapse the distinction between ecological and epistemic rationality, nor do I countenance uncritical deference. I argue that environmentalism has the resources to give the right answers in the cases that Simpson and Handfield urge against my view.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Preview, Version of record, pdf, 119.0KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1017/epi.2025.10062
Authors
+ Arts and Humanities Research Council
More from this funder
- Funder identifier:
- https://ror.org/0505m1554
- Grant:
- AH/W005077/1
- Publisher:
- Cambridge University Press
- Journal:
- Episteme More from this journal
- Publication date:
- 2025-08-07
- Acceptance date:
- 2025-06-26
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1750-0117
- ISSN:
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1742-3600
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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2132853
- Local pid:
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pubs:2132853
- Deposit date:
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2025-06-27
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Neil Levy
- Copyright date:
- 2025
- Rights statement:
- © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
- Licence:
- CC Attribution (CC BY)
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