Russia's internal borders : institutions, territory, identity

Thesis

This thesis examines the politics of post-Soviet Russia's internal borders. The central argument is that the dynamics of center-regional relations in Russia can best be understood by examing borders as social and political institutions. Borders configure interests, distribute resources, and regulate identity. While the institutional qualities of borders often lay hidden, they are laid bare by conflicts over their status and content. This thesis takes advantage of the centralization processes initiated by Russian President Vladimir Putin to examine the relationship of Russia's internal borders to the dynamics of federal reform, democratization, and state building. The bulk of the thesis compares four Russian regions - the Republic of Kareliia, the Republic of Buriatiia, Perm oblast', and Tiumen oblast' - in their responses to state centralization along several dimensions: the creation of the Federal Districts and Putin's reform of the institution of Presidential Representatives; the revision of regional charters and republican constitutions; the conduct of gubernatorial elections; and the push for regional enlargement. The analysis reveals that Putin's centralization found willing accomplices insofar as it opened up opportunities for regional elites to exploit the discourse and repertoires of centralization within their own regions. The politics of centralization demonstrate how the multiple linkages of internal borders to territory, regional identity, and federal status, established the parameters for political contestation on the regional level and regulated the directionality of center-regional relations.

The thesis makes use of qualitative data gathered through extensive fieldwork in Russia, primarily consisting of interviews and regional press archives. It makes an original contribution to the general political science literature in developing and applying the theoretical notion of borders as social and political institutions. It further makes a substantive contribution in suggesting why Russia's governors willingly gave up the autonomy gained in the 1990s when confronted with state centralization in Putin's first term.

Authors: Goode, J

• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford