Gwiazda on the bayesian argument for god

Journal article

Jeremy Gwiazda made two criticisms of my formulation in terms of Bayes’s theorem of my probabilistic argument for the existence of God. The first criticism depends on his assumption that I claim that the intrinsic probabilities of all propositions depend almost entirely on their simplicity; however, my claim is that that holds only insofar as those propositions are explanatory hypotheses. The second criticism depends on a claim that the intrinsic probabilities of exclusive and exhaustive explanatory hypotheses of a phenomenon must sum to 1; however it is only those probabilities plus the intrinsic probability of the non-occurrence of the phenomenon which must sum to 1.

Authors: Swinburne, R

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Springer
• Journal: Philosophia
• Volume: 39
• Issue: 02
• Pages: 393–396
• Publication date: 2010-09-23
• Acceptance date: 2010-09-14
• DOI: 10.1007/s11406-010-9283-4
• EISSN: 1574-9274
• ISSN: 0048-3893
• Language: English
• Keywords: Swinburne; Bayes’s theorem; Gwiazda; The existence of God; SBTMR