Blame games, problem denial, and relational distance

Journal article

Problem denial is the blame-avoider’s strategy of choice. If alleged harms can be rebutted or reframed, the blame game is forestalled before it begins. In current theory, problem denial is thought to be limited by plausibility and reputation. If denials stretch credulity, or if the denier has a trackrecord of denial, the strategy will be short-lived. Conversely, this article investigates whether problem denial is enabled by seniority within the machinery of government. By observing how different tiers of UK central government respond to 235 inquiries by the Public Accounts Committee, it shows that the core executive does indeed rebut more criticism than ordinary line ministries, whereas ministries and administrative agencies show no difference. Qualitative analysis of committee transcripts indicates that this is explained by lower relational distance between committee and finance ministry, which is regarded as an ally in promoting value-for-money and so granted more license to deny.

Authors: Elston, T; Cooper, CA; Bilous, A

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Journal: West European Politics
• Publication date: 2025-12-21
• Acceptance date: 2025-11-10
• DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2025.2591535
• EISSN: 1743-9655
• ISSN: 0140-2382
• Language: English
• Keywords: supreme audit institutions; blame avoidance; bureaucracy; lightning rods; select committees