Why entrench?

Journal article

Most of the time the rules that determine the process by which an institution makes law are constant across the range of its law-making activities. Amongst other things, these rules set the quorum for the body, the number of times it must consider and vote on a proposal, and the number of office-holders in the institution who must approve the measure before it becomes law. Though the body may make decisions on many different areas of law, these procedural rules – what we might describe as the institution’s default rules – remain the same. These rules should have been chosen for good reasons; they should help the institution succeed in its constitutional role, and, consequently, departure from them requires an explanation. Why, in this instance, not apply the default rules? This paper considers situations in which law-making has been rendered harder: situations in which an area of law has been entrenched, and an institution must engage in a special and more arduous process to change the law.

Authors: Barber, N

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Journal: International Journal of Constitutional Law
• Volume: 14
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 325-350
• Publication date: 2016-07-08
• Acceptance date: 2015-07-31
• DOI: 10.1093/icon/mow030
• EISSN: 1474-2659
• ISSN: 1474-2640