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The deception of the Greeks: generalizing the information structure of extensive form games

Abstract:

The standard model of an extensive form game rules out an important phenomenon in situations of strategic interaction: deception. Using examples from the world of ancient Greece and from modern-day Wall Street, we show how the model can be generalized to incorporate this phenomenon. Deception takes place when the action observed by a player is different from the action actually taken. The standard model does allow imperfect information (modeled by non-singleton information sets), but not dece...

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Publication status:
Published

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Publisher:
University of Oxford
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Publication date:
2002-12-01
Paper number:
137
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1144295
Local pid:
pubs:1144295
Deposit date:
2020-12-15

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