Journal article
Twenty-one arguments against propensity analyses of probability
- Abstract:
- I argue that any broadly dispositional analysis of probability will either fail to give an adequate explication of probability, or else will fail to provide an explication that can be gainfully employed elsewhere (for instance, in empirical science or in the regulation of credence). The diversity and number of arguments suggests that there is little prospect of any successful analysis along these lines.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Accepted manuscript, bin, 177.6KB, Terms of use)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1023/B:ERKE.0000023408.61887.6a
Authors
- Publisher:
- Kluwer Academic Publishers (now Springer)
- Journal:
- Erkenntnis More from this journal
- Volume:
- 60
- Issue:
- 3
- Pages:
- 371–416
- Publication date:
- 2004-05-01
- Edition:
- Accepted Manuscript
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1572-8420
- ISSN:
-
0165-0106
- Language:
-
English
- Keywords:
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:60042f77-46ca-4f0a-8e81-599467561d02
- Local pid:
-
ora:1526
- Deposit date:
-
2008-03-14
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Kluwer Academic Publishers (now part of Springer Netherlands)
- Copyright date:
- 2004
- Notes:
- Citation: Eagle, A. (2004). 'Twenty-one arguments against propensity analyses of probability', Erkenntnis, 60(3), 371–416. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record