Commentary on ‘What virtue adds to value’

Journal article

Pettigrove’s paper argues strongly and effectively against a proportionality principle grounded on a univocal scale of value, and argues in favour of a kind of virtue ethics that is focused exclusively on the characteristic and non-univocal attitudes of the subject. In my critique, however, I point out that not all proponents of value ethics adhere to the proportionality principle and that the radical shift from object to subject has risks that were highlighted in a book by C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man. I also point out that Pettigrove in fact treats ‘I love you’ and ‘I forgive you’ substantively in terms of a first-person act in which any relationship-enabling response by the second person is accidental. On this account, there seems to be an underlying ethical challenge, namely that the Pettigrovian valuers are in reality isolated, cut off from relationships based on genuine union with second persons.

Authors: Pinsent, A

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Routledge
• Journal: Australasian Philosophical Review
• Volume: 6
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 148-155
• Publication date: 2024-04-30
• Acceptance date: 2019-10-19
• DOI: 10.1080/24740500.2022.2263956
• EISSN: 2474-0519
• ISSN: 2474-0500
• Language: English
• Keywords: second-person perspective; first-person perspective; non-univocal values; proportionality principle