Affirmative action through extra prizes

Journal article

Abstract:: Some affirmative action policies establish that a set of disadvantaged competitors has access to an extra prize. We analyse the effects of creating an extra prize by reducing the prize in the main competition. Contestants differ in ability and agents with relatively low ability belong to a disadvantaged minority. All contestants compete for the main prize, but only disadvantaged agents can win the extra prize. We show that an extra prize is a powerful tool to ensure participation of disadvantaged agents. Moreover, for intermediate levels of the disadvantage of the minority, introducing an extra prize increases total equilibrium effort compared to a standard contest. Thus, even a contest designer not interested in affirmative action might establish an extra prize in order to enhance competition.

Files:: DahmEsteveAAM.pdf

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Publisher:: Elsevier
Journal:: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization More from this journal
Volume:: 153
Issue:: 2018
Pages:: 123-142
Publication date:: 2018-07-28
Acceptance date:: 2018-06-29
DOI:: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.016
ISSN:: 0167-2681

Language:: English
Keywords:: affirmative action

asymmetric contest

discrimination

prize structure

equality of opportunity

exclusion principle
Pubs id:: pubs:980280
UUID:: uuid:5cc98d56-02e7-4f46-8da1-8d5b75edfed7
Local pid:: pubs:980280
Source identifiers:: 980280
Deposit date:: 2019-08-23

Copyright holder:: Elsevier
Notes:: This is the accepted manuscript version of the record. The final version is available from Elsevier at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.016

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

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