Journal article
Permanent value
- Abstract:
- Temporal nihilism is the view that our lives will not matter after we die. According to the standard interpretation, this is because our lives will not make a permanent difference. Many who consider the view thus reject it by denying that our lives need to have an eternal impact. However, in this essay, I develop a different formulation of temporal nihilism revolving around the persistence of personal value itself. According to this more powerful conception of nihilism, we do not have personal value after death, so our past life no longer has well-being after we die. The standard objections to the standard interpretation do not apply to this more nihilistic nihilism. I offer a new response according to which personal value persists after death because the person continues to exist.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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(Preview, Version of record, pdf, 277.4KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1017/apa.2021.16
Authors
- Publisher:
- Cambridge University Press
- Journal:
- Journal of the American Philosophical Association More from this journal
- Volume:
- 8
- Issue:
- 2
- Pages:
- 356-372
- Publication date:
- 2021-11-05
- Acceptance date:
- 2021-11-05
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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2053-4485
- ISSN:
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2053-4477
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Christopher Frugé
- Copyright date:
- 2021
- Rights statement:
- © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited
- Licence:
- CC Attribution (CC BY)
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