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Beyond sacrificial harm: a two dimensional model of utilitarian decision-making

Abstract:
Recent research has relied on ‘trolley’ type sacrificial moral dilemmas to study ‘utilitarian’ vs. ‘non-utilitarian’ modes of moral decision-making. This approach has generated important insights into people’s willingness to endorse instrumental harm in certain circumstances—typically, sacrificing one individual in order to save a greater number—but also has serious limitations. Most notably, it ignores the positive, altruistic core of utilitarianism, which is characterized by impartial concern for the well-being of everyone, whether near or far. Here, we develop, refine, and validate a new scale – the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale – to dissociate individual differences in the ‘negative’ (willingness to cause instrumental harm) and ‘positive’ (impartial concern about the greater good) dimensions of utilitarian thinking as manifested in the general population. We show that these are two independent dimensions of proto-utilitarian tendencies in the lay population, each exhibiting a distinct psychological profile. Empathic concern, identification with the whole of humanity, and concern for future generations were positively associated with Impartial Beneficence but negatively associated with Instrumental Harm, and while Instrumental Harm was associated with sub-clinical psychopathy, Impartial Beneficence was associated with higher religiosity. Importantly, while these two dimensions were independent in the lay population they were closely associated in a sample of moral philosophers. Acknowledging this dissociation between the Instrumental Harm and Impartial Beneficence components of utilitarian thinking in ordinary people can clarify existing debates about the nature of moral psychology and its relation to moral philosophy as well as generate fruitful avenues for further research.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1037/rev0000093

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
Humanities Division
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
Humanities Division
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MSD
Department:
Experimental Psychology
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MSD
Department:
Experimental Psychology
Role:
Author


Publisher:
American Psychological Association
Journal:
Psychological Review More from this journal
Volume:
125
Issue:
2
Pages:
131-164
Publication date:
2017-12-21
Acceptance date:
2017-10-13
DOI:
EISSN:
1939-1471
ISSN:
0033-295X


Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:735532
UUID:
uuid:57a7b50e-bbb7-4ec6-b8dc-9be8e69fa0e2
Local pid:
pubs:735532
Source identifiers:
735532
Deposit date:
2017-10-16
ARK identifier:

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