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Indicative conditionals and epistemic luminosity

Abstract:
Kevin Dorst has recently pointed out an apparently puzzling consequence of denying epistemic luminosity: given some natural-sounding bridging principles between knowledge, credence, and indicative conditionals, the denial of epistemic luminosity licenses the knowledge and assertability of abominable-sounding conditionals of the form ┌If I don’t know that ϕ, then ϕ┐⁠. We provide a general and systematic examination of this datum by testing Dorst’s claim against various semantics for the indicative conditional in the setting of epistemic logic. Our conclusion is that, regardless of whether knowledge is luminous, the knowability of these conditionals is highly sensitive to the correct semantic analysis of the indicative conditional. Moreover, standard pragmatic resources can explain away the infelicity of such assertions. As it stands, the datum does not tell against epistemic non-luminosity.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1093/mind/fzab064

Authors

More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Oxford college:
Somerville College
Role:
Author
ORCID:
0000-0002-3175-3334


Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Journal:
Mind More from this journal
Volume:
131
Issue:
521
Pages:
231–258
Publication date:
2021-12-13
Acceptance date:
2021-07-27
DOI:
EISSN:
1460-2113
ISSN:
0026-4423


Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1226775
Local pid:
pubs:1226775
Deposit date:
2021-12-21
ARK identifier:

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