Journal article
Becoming authentic: a social conception of the self
- Abstract:
- Two approaches to authenticity have gained currency in the recent analytic philosophical literature. The first takes authenticity to be a property of how people act (authentic agency). The second takes it to be a property of who people are (authentic self). This paper motivates both views, then argues that there is a dependency between the two: the exercise of authentic agency depends on the possession of an authentic self, while the possession of an authentic self relies on the prior exercise of authentic agency. On a particular, individualist conception of the self, this leads to a paradox. This paradox is resolved if one instead adopts a social conception of the self, according to which the self is partially ontologically constituted by other agents (a ‘we’, rather than an ‘I’).
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Version of record, pdf, 492.0KB, Terms of use)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1093/pq/pqaf008
Authors
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- Journal:
- Philosophical Quarterly More from this journal
- Article number:
- pqaf008
- Publication date:
- 2025-01-30
- Acceptance date:
- 2025-01-09
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1467-9213
- ISSN:
-
0031-8094
- Language:
-
English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
2078671
- Local pid:
-
pubs:2078671
- Deposit date:
-
2025-01-15
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Samuel A Mortimer
- Copyright date:
- 2025
- Rights statement:
- © The Author(s) 2025. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
- Licence:
- CC Attribution (CC BY)
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record