Journal article
Criminalization without punishment
- Abstract:
- What is the relationship between a theory of permissible criminalization and a theory of permissible state punishment? One answer runs as follows: to identify the conditions under which it is permissible to criminalize, we must first identify the conditions under which it is permissible for the state to punish. The latter set of conditions doubles as part of the former set. Call this the punishment thesis. It is a thesis with some prominent advocates, but explicit defenses are hard to find. In this paper, I ask how such a defense might proceed. Section I clarifies the punishment thesis itself. Sections II–IV consider a number of arguments in its favor. My contention is that none of these arguments succeeds. Unless a better argument can be found, we should reject the punishment thesis.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 284.8KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1017/S1352325217000210
Authors
- Publisher:
- Cambridge University Press
- Journal:
- Legal Theory More from this journal
- Volume:
- 23
- Issue:
- 2
- Pages:
- 69-95
- Publication date:
- 2017-08-31
- Acceptance date:
- 2017-05-22
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1469-8048
- ISSN:
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1352-3252
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:722811
- UUID:
-
uuid:56003969-6f9e-4f54-bd8d-e077e2349ebd
- Local pid:
-
pubs:722811
- Source identifiers:
-
722811
- Deposit date:
-
2017-08-19
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Cambridge University Press
- Copyright date:
- 2017
- Notes:
- Copyright © 2017 Cambridge University Press. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Cambridge University Press at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325217000210
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