Journal article
Ambiguous language and common priors
- Abstract:
- Standard economic models cannot capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and is interpreted in multiple ways. Using a framework that distinguishes between the language in which statements are made and the interpretation of statements, we demonstrate that, unlike in the case where there is no ambiguity, players may come to have different beliefs starting from a common prior, even if they have received exactly the same information, unless the information is common knowledge.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 275.7KB, Terms of use)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1016/j.geb.2015.01.007
Authors
- Publisher:
- Elsevier
- Journal:
- Games and Economic Behavior More from this journal
- Volume:
- 90
- Issue:
- C
- Pages:
- 171-180
- Publication date:
- 2015-02-20
- DOI:
- ISSN:
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0899-8256
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:728173
- UUID:
-
uuid:5578ab10-3dc4-4f32-827a-8ec0f58ed686
- Local pid:
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pubs:728173
- Source identifiers:
-
728173
- Deposit date:
-
2018-11-19
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Elsevier Inc.
- Copyright date:
- 2015
- Rights statement:
- © 2015 Elsevier Inc.
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Elsevier at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.01.007
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