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What do multiwinner voting rules do? An experiment over the two-dimensional Euclidean domain

Abstract:
We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules — SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin–Courant, and PAV — for elections generated according to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three applications of multiwinner voting, namely, parliamentary elections, portfolio/movie selection, and shortlisting, and use our results to understand which of our rules seem to be best suited for each application. In particular, we show that STV (one of the few nontrivial rules used in real high-stake elections) exhibits excellent performance, whereas the Bloc rule (also often used in practice) performs poorly.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10612
Publication website:
https://aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI17/paper/view/14924

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Role:
Author


Publisher:
AAAI Press
Host title:
Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Pages:
494-501
Publication date:
2017-02-10
Acceptance date:
2016-11-11
Event title:
Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Event location:
San Francisco, California, USA
Event website:
https://www.aaai.org/Conferences/AAAI/aaai17.php
Event start date:
2017-02-04
Event end date:
2017-02-09
DOI:


Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
738752
Local pid:
pubs:738752
Deposit date:
2021-04-17
ARK identifier:

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