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Journal article

Fiscal inertia, donor credibility, and the monetary management of aid surges

Abstract:
Donors cannot pre-commit to support scaled-up public spending programs on a continuing basis, nor can governments credibly commit to curtail expenditure rapidly in the event that aid revenues contract. An aid boom may therefore be accompanied by a credibility problem. When this is the case, the absorb-and-spend strategy recommended by the IMF leads to capital flight, higher inflation, and large current account surpluses inclusive of aid. The right policy package combines a critical minimum degree of fiscal restraint with reverse sterilization.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Not peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.09.006

Authors


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Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
International Development
Role:
Author


Publisher:
Elsevier
Journal:
Journal of Development Economics More from this journal
Volume:
93
Issue:
2
Pages:
287-298
Publication date:
2010-11-01
DOI:
ISSN:
0304-3878


Keywords:
UUID:
uuid:54983f7e-144e-4da7-b591-c186b5a787a4
Local pid:
daisy:1403
Source identifiers:
1403
Deposit date:
2012-08-07

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