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A possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions

Abstract:
Drawing on the so-called 'doctrinal paradox', List and Pettit (2002a) have shown that, given an unrestricted domain condition, there exists no procedure for aggregating individual sets of judgments over multiple interconnected propositions into corresponding collective ones, where the procedure satisfies some minimal conditions similar to the conditions of Arrow's theorem. I prove that we can avoid the paradox and the associated impossibility result by introducing an appropriate domain restriction: a structure condition, called unidimensional alignment, is shown to open up a possibiity result, similar in spirit to Black's median voter theorem (1948). Specifically, I prove that, given unidimensional alignment, propositionwise majority voting is the unique procedure for aggregating individul sets of judgments into collective ones in accordance with the above mentioned minimal conditions.
Publication status:
Published

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Publisher:
University of Oxford
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Publication date:
2002-10-01
Paper number:
123


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Pubs id:
1144306
Local pid:
pubs:1144306
Deposit date:
2020-12-15
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