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Principal and Expert Agent.

Abstract:

This paper analyses principal-agent contracts when the agent's action generates information not directly verifiable but used by the agent to make a risky decision. It considers a more general formulation than those studied previously, focusing on the impact on the decision made and the contract between principal and agent. It establishes a precise sense in which distorting decisions reduces the risk borne by a risk-averse agent and conditions under which implementing an optimal decision rule ...

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Publisher:
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2004-01-01
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:538e7e03-4efe-4dd8-93c6-c4949e73ffb1
Local pid:
ora:1232
Deposit date:
2011-08-16

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