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Influencing Rent-Seeking Contests.

Abstract:

This paper shows that a policy that uniformly increases contestants' effort costs can lead to an increase in total effort. In asymmetric settings, this "levels the playing field" and therefore encourages weaker players (who otherwise would have stayed out) to enter. Paradoxically, a contest designer whose only objective is to maximize total effort may thus wish to make rent-seeking "more difficult." These results suggest that the often-lamented bureaucratic red tape might in fact be a rationa...

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Authors


Robert A Ritz More by this author
Journal:
Public Choice
Volume:
135
Publication date:
2008
URN:
uuid:532af0ae-06ca-432b-9e29-eff497808cb9
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:12836
Language:
English

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