Journal article
Tennant on knowable truth
- Abstract:
- The paper responds to Neil Tennant's recent discussion of Fitch's so-called paradox of knowability in the context of intuitionistic logic. Tennant's criticisms of the author's earlier work on this topic are shown to rest on a principle about the assertability of disjunctions with the absurd consequence that everything we could make true already is true. Tennant restricts the anti-realist principle that truth implies knowability in order to escape Fitch's argument, but a more complex variant of the argument is shown to elicit from his restricted principle exactly the consequences which it was intended to avoid.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Authors
- Publisher:
- Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
- Journal:
- Ratio More from this journal
- Volume:
- 13
- Issue:
- 2
- Pages:
- 99-114
- Publication date:
- 2000-06-01
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1467-9329
- ISSN:
-
0034-0006
- Language:
-
English
- Keywords:
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:4f95ec88-a710-412a-a843-40ed55dd1126
- Local pid:
-
ora:5712
- Deposit date:
-
2011-09-27
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Blackwell Publishers Ltd
- Copyright date:
- 2000
- Notes:
- The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA, but you may be able to access the article via the publisher copy link on this record page. Citation: Williamson, T. (2000). 'Tennant on knowable truth', Ratio 13(2), 99-114. [Available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rati.2000.13.issue-2/issuetoc]. N.B. Timothy Williamson is now based at the Philosophy Faculty, University of Oxford.
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