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When does delegation improve credibility? Central bank independence and the separation of powers

Publication status:: Published

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APA Style

Keefer, P., & Stasavage, D. (1998). When does delegation improve credibility? Central bank independence and the separation of powers. University of Oxford.

MLA Style

Keefer, P, and D Stasavage. “When Does Delegation Improve Credibility? Central Bank Independence and the Separation of Powers.” University of Oxford, 1998. CSAE Working Paper Series.

Chicago Style

Keefer, P, and D Stasavage. 1998. “When Does Delegation Improve Credibility? Central Bank Independence and the Separation of Powers.” CSAE Working Paper Series. University of Oxford.
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Authors

+ Keefer, P More by this author

Role:: Author

+ Stasavage, D More by this author

Role:: Author

Publisher:: University of Oxford
Series:: CSAE Working Paper Series
Publication date:: 1998-01-18
Paper number:: WPS/1998-18

Pubs id:: 1144861
Local pid:: pubs:1144861
Deposit date:: 2020-12-15
ARK identifier:: ark:/29072/ora_4b09b5bd4d43477d97946ccdec6882c9

Terms of use

Copyright date:: 1998
Rights statement:: Copyright 1998 The Author(s)

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

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