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Naive realism and the science of illusion

Abstract:

Critics have long complained that naïve realism cannot adequately account for perceptual illusion. This complaint has a tendency to ally itself with the aspersion that naïve realism is hopelessly out of touch with vision science. Here I offer a partial reply to both complaint and aspersion. I do so by showing how careful reflection on a simple, empirically grounded model of illusion reveals heterodox ways of thinking about familiar illusions which are quite congenial to the naïve realist.

Publication status:
Accepted
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted Manuscript

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Oxford, HUM, Philosophy Faculty
Publisher:
Philosophy Documentation Center Publisher's website
Journal:
Philosophical Topics Journal website
Volume:
44
Issue:
2
Publication date:
2016
EISSN:
2154-154X
ISSN:
0276-2080
URN:
uuid:4ac0d71c-001c-4db4-86d1-bd3062eaf465
Source identifiers:
620009
Local pid:
pubs:620009

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