Journal article icon

Journal article

Countering essentialism in psychiatric narratives

Abstract:
The practice of self-diagnosing, amplified by the spread of psychiatric knowledge through social media, has grown rapidly. Yet, the motivations behind this trend, and, critically, its psychological repercussions remain poorly understood. Self-ascribing a psychiatric label always occurs within a broader narrative context, with narratives serving as essential interpretive tools for understanding oneself and others.In this paper, we identify four principal motivators for people pursuing self-diagnosis, pertaining to 1. waiting time and cost of mental health resources, 2. recognition, 3. identity formation, and 4. destigmatization. We compare these motivators against the backdrops of psychiatric narratives, including DSM-based (operationalism), bio-medical, and Neurodiversity narratives, to evaluate the psychological implications of self-ascriptions. We show that while self-ascription aligns with many motivations, it also carries the risk of essentialism across all analyzed narratives, which can over-simplify and sometimes misrepresent people’s attempts to find meaning through psychiatric labels. Essentialism makes narratives less comprehensive, responsive, and resourceful.We contend that self-ascriptions are not inherently problematic; instead, they show the need for greater focus and understanding in psychiatric practices and the importance of incorporating people’s experiences and perspectives in clinical settings. However, both the narratives and the social climate from which they emerge may need adjustments to make self-ascriptions meaningful, comprehensive, and resourceful tools.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

Actions


Access Document


Publisher copy:
10.1080/09515089.2024.2407502

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MSD
Department:
Experimental Psychology
Oxford college:
St Anne's College
Role:
Author
ORCID:
0000-0002-2181-8915
More by this author
Role:
Author
ORCID:
0000-0002-3725-6224


Publisher:
Taylor & Francis
Journal:
Philosophical Psychology More from this journal
Pages:
1-29
Publication date:
2024-09-25
Acceptance date:
2024-09-16
DOI:
EISSN:
1465-394X
ISSN:
0951-5089


Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
2036980
Local pid:
pubs:2036980
Deposit date:
2024-10-07

Terms of use



Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP