Journal article
Consensus in opinion dynamics as a repeated game
- Abstract:
- We study an n-agent averaging process with dynamics subject to controls and adversarial disturbances. The model arises in multi-population opinion dynamics with macroscopic and microscopic intertwined dynamics. The averaging process describes the in uence from neighbouring populations, whereas the input term indicates how the distribution of opinions in the population changes as a result of dynamical evolutions at a microscopic level (individuals' changing opinions). The input term is obtained as the vector payoff of a two player repeated game. We study conditions under which the agents achieve robust consensus to some predefined target set. Such conditions build upon the approachability principle in repeated games with vector payoffs.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 1.1MB, Terms of use)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1016/j.automatica.2017.12.062
Authors
- Publisher:
- Elsevier
- Journal:
- Automatica More from this journal
- Volume:
- 90
- Pages:
- 204-211
- Publication date:
- 2018-02-17
- Acceptance date:
- 2017-10-31
- DOI:
- ISSN:
-
0005-1098
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:807137
- UUID:
-
uuid:464a519d-db4f-450e-b936-f55baa4a3861
- Local pid:
-
pubs:807137
- Source identifiers:
-
807137
- Deposit date:
-
2017-12-01
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Elsevier Ltd
- Copyright date:
- 2018
- Notes:
- © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Elsevier at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2017.12.062
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record