Journal article
'International Meaning': Comity in Fundamental Rights Adjudication
- Abstract:
- In fundamental rights adjudication, should judges defer to the judgment of other decision makers? How can they defer, without betraying the respect that judges ought to accord those rights? How can they refuse to defer, without betraying the respect that judges ought to accord to other decision makers? I argue that only principles of comity (such as the principles of subsidiarity in the Strasbourg Court and justiciability in the British courts) justify deference, and their reach is limited. Comity never forbids the judges to take and to act upon a different view of fundamental rights from that of another decision maker. I elaborate this view by reference to the decision of the House of Lords in Adan and Aitseguer [2001] 1 All ER 593.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 198.9KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1093/ijrl/13.3.280
Authors
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- Journal:
- International Journal of Refugee Law More from this journal
- Volume:
- 13
- Issue:
- 3
- Pages:
- 280–292
- Publication date:
- 2001-07-01
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1464-3715
- ISSN:
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0953-8186
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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pubs:623440
- UUID:
-
uuid:45e6d7cf-1eac-45ea-9431-0babf14908a2
- Local pid:
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pubs:623440
- Source identifiers:
-
623440
- Deposit date:
-
2016-05-21
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Oxford University Press
- Copyright date:
- 2001
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript of a journal article published by Oxford University Press in International Journal of Refugee Law on 2001-07-01, available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/13.3.280
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