Journal article
The philosophical problem of vagueness
- Abstract:
- Think of the color spectrum, spread out before you. You can identify the different colors with ease. But if you are asked to indicate the point at which one color ends and the next begins, you are at a loss. "There is no such point", is a natural thought: one color just shades gradually into the next.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Preview, Version of record, pdf, 43.9KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1017/S1352325201704028
Authors
- Publisher:
- Cambridge University Press
- Journal:
- Legal Theory More from this journal
- Volume:
- 7
- Issue:
- 4
- Pages:
- 371-378
- Publication date:
- 2001-12-01
- Edition:
- Publisher's version
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1469-8048
- ISSN:
-
1352-3252
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:4128c658-c457-4db2-a92c-6e7d54437cd5
- Local pid:
-
ora:1539
- Deposit date:
-
2008-03-14
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Cambridge University Press
- Copyright date:
- 2001
- Notes:
- Citation: Edgington, D. (2001). 'The philosophical problem of vagueness', Law Theory, 7(4), 371-378. [Available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=LEG].
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