- Abstract:
-
Over the last 30 years, globalization and advances in algorithmic trading have created new opportunities to engage in transnational market abuse, i.e., insider trading and market manipulation perpetrated across national borders. Regulators use various institutional arrangements to detect these schemes. What explains this variation? Or, more broadly, what determines the form of international cooperation public agencies utilize to detect transnational phenomena?
To answer t...
Expand abstract - Role:
- Supervisor
- Role:
- Supervisor
- ORCID:
- 0000-0003-2098-7634
- Grant:
- Programme:
- Radcliffe Scholarship
- Grant:
- Programme:
- Radcliffe Scholarship
- Type of award:
- DPhil
- Level of award:
- Doctoral
- Awarding institution:
- University of Oxford
- Language:
- English
- Keywords:
- Subjects:
- Copyright holder:
- Kellerman, M
- Copyright date:
- 2020
Thesis
Surveillance games: the international political economy of combatting transnational market abuse
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Authors
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+ Mattli, W
+ Snidal, D
Funding
+ University College, University of Oxford
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+ Department of Politics and International Relations
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