Surveillance games: the international political economy of combatting transnational market abuse

Kellerman, M

Thesis

Surveillance games: the international political economy of combatting transnational market abuse

Abstract:: Over the last 30 years, globalization and advances in algorithmic trading have created new opportunities to engage in transnational market abuse, i.e., insider trading and market manipulation perpetrated across national borders. Regulators use various institutional arrangements to detect these schemes. What explains this variation? Or, more broadly, what determines the form of international cooperation public agencies utilize to detect transnational phenomena?

To answer this question, I present and test the Two-level Cooperation Framework (TLCF). The TLCF’s core argument is that public agencies’ decision to outsource surveillance to non-state actors (i.e., regulatory intermediaries) in the past impacts the form of cooperation they utilize in the future. The TLCF conceptualizes this process as a sequential two-level game, in which public agencies must engage their regulatory intermediaries in a strategic interaction (domestic game) before negotiating with their foreign counterparts (international game). The sequential outcomes of these ‘surveillance games’ will, I contend, determine the form of cooperation public agencies utilize.

A structured-focused comparison of five case studies corroborates the TLCF’s theoretical expectations. To perform these case studies, data was collected from numerous archives, a Freedom of Information Act Request, and 86 interviews in six countries. The results contribute to our understanding of International Relations (IR) by challenging a widely held implicit assumption that state and sub-state actors are able to share information with their foreign counterparts. By relaxing this assumption, the TLCF unveils novel causal pathways by which public agencies’ previous outsourcing decisions impact their future capacity and/or desire to engage in certain forms of cooperation. These observations are potentially generalizable to an increasing number of policy arenas governed by public-private partnerships. Through its analysis of transnational market abuse, this thesis pushes IR to consider the potential consequences of these partnerships for the form and effectiveness of international regulatory cooperation.

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APA Style

Kellerman, M. (2020). Surveillance games: the international political economy of combatting transnational market abuse [PhD thesis]. University of Oxford.

MLA Style

Kellerman, M. Surveillance Games: the International Political Economy of Combatting Transnational Market Abuse. University of Oxford, 2020.

Chicago Style

Kellerman, M. 2020. “Surveillance Games: the International Political Economy of Combatting Transnational Market Abuse.” PhD thesis, University of Oxford.
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