Journal article
Epiphenomenal properties
- Abstract:
- What is an epiphenomenal property? This question needs to be settled before we can decide whether higher-level properties are epiphenomenal or not. In this paper, I offer an account of what it is for a property to have some causal power. From this, I derive a characterization of the notion of an epiphenomenal property. I then argue that physically realized higher-level properties are not epiphenomenal, because laws of nature impose causal similarities on the bearers of such properties, and these similarities figure as powers in the causal profiles of these properties.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 112.5KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1080/00048402.2017.1366534
Authors
- Publisher:
- Routledge
- Journal:
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy More from this journal
- Volume:
- 96
- Issue:
- 3
- Pages:
- 419-431
- Publication date:
- 2017-08-21
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1471-6828
- ISSN:
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0004-8402
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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pubs:1036904
- UUID:
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uuid:3ec958b0-4f1d-4a03-8d62-98afa433ee39
- Local pid:
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pubs:1036904
- Source identifiers:
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1036904
- Deposit date:
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2019-08-01
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Australasian Association of Philosophy
- Copyright date:
- 2017
- Notes:
- Copyright © 2017 Australasian Association of Philosophy. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Routledge at:https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2017.1366534
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