The substitutional analysis of logical consequence

Journal article

A substitutional account of logical validity for formal first‐order languages is developed and defended against competing accounts such as the model‐theoretic definition of validity. Roughly, a substitution instance of a sentence is defined as the result of uniformly substituting nonlogical expressions in the sentence with expressions of the same grammatical category and possibly relativizing quantifiers. In particular, predicate symbols can be replaced with formulae possibly containing additional free variables. A sentence is defined to be logically true iff all its substitution instances are satisfied by all variable assignments. Logical consequence is defined analogously. Satisfaction is taken to be a primitive notion and axiomatized.

For every set‐theoretic model in the sense of model theory there exists a corresponding substitutional interpretation in a sense to be specified. Conversely, however, there are substitutional interpretations – in particular the ‘intended’ interpretation – that lack a model‐theoretic counterpart. The substitutional definition of logical validity overcomes the weaknesses of more restrictive accounts of substitutional validity; unlike model‐theoretic logical consequence, the substitutional notion is trivially and provably truth preserving. In Kreisel's squeezing argument the formal notion of substitutional validity naturally slots into the place of intuitive validity.

Authors: Halbach, V

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Wiley
• Journal: Noûs
• Volume: 54
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 431-450
• Publication date: 2018-06-08
• Acceptance date: 2018-05-19
• DOI: 10.1111/nous.12256
• EISSN: 1468-0068
• ISSN: 0029-4624
• Language: English