Working paper

Dependence and uniqueness in Bayesian games

Abstract:
This paper studies uniqueness of equilibrium in symmetric 2 x 2 bayesian games. It shows that if signals are highly but not perfectly dependent then players play their risk-dominant actions for all but a vanishing set of signal realizations. In contrast to the global games literature, noise is not assumed to be additive. Dependence is modeled using the theory of copulas.
Publication status:
Published

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Publisher:
University of Oxford Publisher's website
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Publication date:
2012-04-01
Paper number:
603
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1143830
Local pid:
pubs:1143830
Deposit date:
2020-12-15