- Abstract:
-
A minimal requirement on allocative efficiency in the social sciences is Pareto optimality. In this paper, we identify a close structural connection between Pareto optimality and perfection that has various algorithmic consequences for coalition formation. Based on this insight, we formulate the Preference Refinement Algorithm (PRA) which computes an individually rational and Pareto optimal outcome in hedonic coalition formation games. Our approach also leads to various results for specific c...
Expand abstract - Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
- Version:
- Accepted manuscript
- Files:
-
-
(pdf, 431.3KB)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.006
-
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- Grant:
- BR-2312/6-1; BR 2312/7-1; BR 2312/9-1
- Publisher:
- Elsevier Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Games and Economic Behavior Journal website
- Volume:
- 82
- Pages:
- 562-581
- Chapter number:
- C
- Publication date:
- 2013-09-03
- DOI:
- ISSN:
-
0899-8256
- URN:
-
uuid:3a91def3-1c6e-4898-b5bb-7b8c6457da51
- Source identifiers:
-
591933
- Local pid:
- pubs:591933
- Copyright holder:
- Elsevier
- Copyright date:
- 2013
- Notes:
- © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Elsevier at: [10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.006]
Journal article
Pareto optimality in coalition formation
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