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Pareto optimality in coalition formation

Abstract:

A minimal requirement on allocative efficiency in the social sciences is Pareto optimality. In this paper, we identify a close structural connection between Pareto optimality and perfection that has various algorithmic consequences for coalition formation. Based on this insight, we formulate the Preference Refinement Algorithm (PRA) which computes an individually rational and Pareto optimal outcome in hedonic coalition formation games. Our approach also leads to various results for specific c...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted manuscript

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Publisher copy:
10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.006

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Oxford, MPLS, Computer Science
Role:
Author
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Grant:
BR-2312/6-1; BR 2312/7-1; BR 2312/9-1
Publisher:
Elsevier Publisher's website
Journal:
Games and Economic Behavior Journal website
Volume:
82
Pages:
562-581
Chapter number:
C
Publication date:
2013-09-03
DOI:
ISSN:
0899-8256
URN:
uuid:3a91def3-1c6e-4898-b5bb-7b8c6457da51
Source identifiers:
591933
Local pid:
pubs:591933

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