Journal article
Pareto optimality in coalition formation
- Abstract:
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A minimal requirement on allocative efficiency in the social sciences is Pareto optimality. In this paper, we identify a close structural connection between Pareto optimality and perfection that has various algorithmic consequences for coalition formation. Based on this insight, we formulate the Preference Refinement Algorithm (PRA) which computes an individually rational and Pareto optimal outcome in hedonic coalition formation games. Our approach also leads to various results for specific c...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
-
-
(Accepted manuscript, pdf, 431.3KB)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.006
Authors
Funding
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Elsevier Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Games and Economic Behavior Journal website
- Volume:
- 82
- Pages:
- 562-581
- Publication date:
- 2013-09-03
- DOI:
- ISSN:
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0899-8256
- Source identifiers:
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591933
Item Description
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:591933
- UUID:
-
uuid:3a91def3-1c6e-4898-b5bb-7b8c6457da51
- Local pid:
- pubs:591933
- Deposit date:
- 2016-01-20
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Elsevier
- Copyright date:
- 2013
- Notes:
- © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Elsevier at: [10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.006]
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