Plainly wrong

Abstract:: English law and wider common law jurisprudence have endorsed the condition that an appellate court should reject a trial judge's finding of fact which it believes is “plainly wrong”. Courts have not explained what makes a finding plainly wrong, however. Scholars have largely ignored the issue. This article draws on recent work in epistemology to provide a new analysis of the plainly wrong standard. Rationally, a court should not believe both (1) that a judge is a better fact finder and (2) that the judge was wrong to find some fact. If it does believe both, it should abandon the belief it is less confident of. So, a court should reject a judge's finding if it is more confident that it is wrong than that the judge is a better fact finder. This analysis has implications for review of administrative fact finding and for judicial deference generally.

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Copyright holder:: Adam Perry
Rights statement:: © 2022 The Authors. The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.

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