Constitutionalism, quasi-constitutionalism, and representative democracy: the case of Bulgaria
This paper advances a conception of quasi-constitutionalism, consisting of far-reaching but legally unenforceable constraints and limits on the power of political majorities in areas such as economic policy, foreign relations, and social policy.
The paper argues that European Union accession has strengthened quasi-constitutional constraints on the political process in Bulgaria.
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- The social foundations of constitutions
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- The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society
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- Paper presented at The Social Foundations of Constitutions workshop, Oxford, 26 March 2009. © The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society 2010.
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