Hume on justice as a virtue

Thesis

This thesis examines Hume’s theory of justice as a virtue by addressing some of its textual problems and by highlighting its connection with Adam Smith’s and John Stuart Mill’s conceptions of justice. The thesis consists of five chapters. The first discusses the complexities surrounding the well-known ‘Circle Argument’ and argues that justice cannot be considered as a mere habit of action. The second examines the methodological features of Hume’s account of justice as an artificial virtue and concludes that it can be seen as a form of vindicatory genealogy. The third examines the role of the ‘dark passion’ of resentment in the process of moralising justice. The fourth discusses the differences between Smith’s and Hume’s theory of justice with regard to the roles of resentment and utility. Finally, the fifth essay examines the lines of continuity between Hume’s and Mill’s genealogies and the points of contact in their conceptions of the virtue of justice.

Authors: Vaccari, A

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-2aomgy81g
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: moral sentiments; David Hume; justice; resentment; virtue; utilitarianism
• Subjects: Philosophy, Modern--18th century