Journal article
Healthcare appointments as commitment devices
- Abstract:
- We show that ordinary appointments can act as effective substitutes for hard commitment devices and increase demand for a critical healthcare service, particularly among those with self-control problems. We show this using an experiment that randomly offered HIV testing appointments and hard commitment devices to high-risk men in Malawi. Appointments more than double testing rates, with effects concentrated among those who demand commitment. In contrast, most men who take up hard commitments lose their investments. Appointments overcome commitment problems without the potential drawback of commitment failure, and have the potential to increase demand for healthcare in the developing world.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 1.9MB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1093/ej/ueae077
Authors
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- Journal:
- Economic Journal More from this journal
- Volume:
- 135
- Issue:
- 665
- Pages:
- 81-118
- Publication date:
- 2024-08-09
- Acceptance date:
- 2024-08-01
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1468-0297
- ISSN:
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0013-0133
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
2022396
- Local pid:
-
pubs:2022396
- Deposit date:
-
2024-08-19
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Royal Economic Society
- Copyright date:
- 2024
- Rights statement:
- © 2024 Royal Economic Society. Published by Oxford University Press.
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Oxford University Press at https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueae077
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