Working paper icon

Working paper

Cost Asymmetries in International Subsidy Games: Should Governments Help Winners or Losers?

Abstract:

This paper examines the optimality of export subsidies in oligopolistic markets, when home and foreign firms have different costs and there is an opportunity cost to public funds. Subsidies are found to be optimal only for surprisingly low values of the shadow price of government funds, and if subsidies are justified they should be higher the more cost-competitive are domestic firms. These results hold under both Cournot competition and Bertrand competition when firms move before governments....

Expand abstract

Actions


Authors


Volume:
560
Publication date:
1991-01-01
URN:
uuid:3354411a-955a-476f-b4fd-6208300a6979
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:11731
Language:
English

Terms of use


Metrics


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP