Journal article
Product design in selection markets
- Abstract:
- In selection markets, where the cost of serving consumers is heterogeneous and noncontractible, nonprice product features allow a firm to sort profitable from unprofitable consumers. An example of this “sorting by quality” is the use of down payments to dissuade borrowers who are unlikely to repay. We study a model in which consumers have multidimensional types and a firm offers a single product of endogenous quality, as in Spence (1975) . These two ingredients generate a novel sorting incentive in a firm’s first-order condition for quality, which is a simple ratio. The denominator is marginal consumer surplus, a measure of market power. The numerator is the covariance, among marginal consumers, between marginal willingness to pay for quality and cost to the firm. We provide conditions under which this term is signed and contrast the sorting incentives of a profit-maximizer and a social planner. We then use this characterization to quantify the importance of sorting empirically in subprime auto lending, analytically sign its impact in a model of add-on pricing, and calibrate optimal competition policy in health insurance markets. JEL Codes: D41, D42, D43, D86, G21, I13
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 1.2MB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1093/qje/qjw007
Authors
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- Journal:
- Quarterly Journal of Economics More from this journal
- Volume:
- 131
- Issue:
- 2
- Pages:
- 1007–1056
- Publication date:
- 2016-02-24
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1531-4650
- ISSN:
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0033-5533
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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pubs:584925
- UUID:
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uuid:32f81483-eff4-4692-a045-7cbc228eecea
- Local pid:
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info:fedora/pubs:584925
- Source identifiers:
-
584925
- Deposit date:
-
2016-09-06
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Veiga and Weyl
- Copyright date:
- 2016
- Notes:
- Copyright © 2016 The Authors. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of President and Fellows of Harvard College. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Oxford University Press at: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw007
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