Journal article
Product design in selection markets
- Abstract:
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In selection markets, where the cost of serving consumers is heterogeneous and noncontractible, nonprice product features allow a firm to sort profitable from unprofitable consumers. An example of this “sorting by quality” is the use of down payments to dissuade borrowers who are unlikely to repay. We study a model in which consumers have multidimensional types and a firm offers a single product of endogenous quality, as in Spence (1975) . These two ingredients generate a novel sorting incent...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Access Document
- Files:
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 1.2MB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1093/qje/qjw007
Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- Journal:
- Quarterly Journal of Economics More from this journal
- Volume:
- 131
- Issue:
- 2
- Pages:
- 1007–1056
- Publication date:
- 2016-02-24
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1531-4650
- ISSN:
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0033-5533
Item Description
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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pubs:584925
- UUID:
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uuid:32f81483-eff4-4692-a045-7cbc228eecea
- Local pid:
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info:fedora/pubs:584925
- Source identifiers:
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584925
- Deposit date:
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2016-09-06
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Veiga and Weyl
- Copyright date:
- 2016
- Notes:
- Copyright © 2016 The Authors. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of President and Fellows of Harvard College. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Oxford University Press at: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw007
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