Market making with minimum resting times

Journal article

We show how the supply of liquidity in order driven markets is affected if limit orders (LOs) are forced to rest in the limit order book (LOB) for a minimum resting time (MRT) before they can be cancelled. The bid-ask spread increases as the MRT increases because market makers (MMs) increase the depth of their LOs to protect them from being picked off by other traders. We also show that the expected profits of the MMs increase when the MRT increases. The intuition is as follows. As the MRT increases, there are two opposing forces at work. One, the longer the MRT, the more likely the LOs are to be filled and, on average, shares are sold at a loss. Two, because the depth of the posted LOs increases, the probability that the LO is picked off by other traders before the end of the MRT decreases. The net effect is that a longer MRT leads to a higher expected profit. We also show that the depth of LOs increases when the volatility of the price of the asset increases. Also, the depth of LOs increases when the arrival rate of market orders increases because it is less likely that LOs will be picked off by the end of the MRT. Finally, our model also makes predictions about the overall liquidity of the market. We show that MMs choose to supply the minimum amount of shares per LO allowed by the exchange because expected profits are maximised when liquidity provided is lowest

Authors: Cartea, A; Wang, Y

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Routledge
• Journal: Quantitative Finance
• Volume: 19
• Issue: 6
• Pages: 903-920
• Publication date: 2019-01-18
• Acceptance date: 2018-11-30
• DOI: 10.1080/14697688.2018.1556399
• EISSN: 1469-7696
• ISSN: 1469-7688
• Keywords: market making; market quality; regulation; minimum resting times; high-frequency trading