Journal article

Auction Design with a Risk Averse Seller.

Abstract:: We consider auctions with a risk averse seller in independent private values environments with risk neutral buyers. We show that for every incentive compatible selling mechanism there exists a mechanism which provides deterministically the same (expected) revenue.

Actions

Email

Email this record

Send the bibliographic details of this record to your email address.

Your Email
Please enter the email address that the record information will be sent to.

-
Your message (optional)
Please add any additional information to be included within the email.
Cite

Cite this record

APA Style

Eső, P., & Futó, G. (1999). Auction Design with a Risk Averse Seller. Economics Letters, 65(1), 71–74.

MLA Style

Eső, P., and G. Futó. “Auction Design with a Risk Averse Seller.” Economics Letters, vol. 65, no. 1, Elsevier, 1999, pp. 71–74.

Chicago Style

Eső, P, and G Futó. 1999. “Auction Design with a Risk Averse Seller.” Economics Letters 65 (1): 71–74.
Share
Print

Access Document

Publisher copy:: 10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00115-9

Authors

+ Eső, P More by this author

Role:: Author

+ Futó, G More by this author

Role:: Author

Publisher:: Elsevier
Journal:: Economics Letters More from this journal
Volume:: 65
Issue:: 1
Pages:: 71 - 74
Publication date:: 1999-01-01
DOI:: 10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00115-9
ISSN:: 0165-1765

Language:: English
UUID:: uuid:2d062891-1657-45a3-937b-1b2b9469dc64
Local pid:: oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:14794
Deposit date:: 2011-08-16

Terms of use

Copyright date:: 1999

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

Views and Downloads

About views and downloads

If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP