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Principal and Expert Agent.

Abstract:

This paper analyses principal-agent contracts when the agent's action generates information not directly verifiable but used by the agent to make a risky decision. It considers a more general formulation than those studied previously, focusing on the impact on the decision made and the contract between principal and agent. It establishes a precise sense in which distorting decisions reduces the risk borne by a risk-averse agent and conditions under which implementing an optimal decision rule ...

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Publisher copy:
10.2202/1935-1704.1528

Authors


James Malcomson More by this author
Journal:
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Volume:
9
Issue:
1
Publication date:
2009
DOI:
URN:
uuid:2a2060a5-9fb5-40d5-8ba3-53937e9fa60f
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:14922
Language:
English

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