Unjust enrichment claims & countervailing obligations

Thesis

This thesis investigates the relationship between unjust enrichment claims and countervailing legal entitlements of the defendant. It examines the cases that deny restitution on the basis that the enrichment was owed to the defendant under a valid legal obligation. The authorities suggest that there are two separate rules that perform this function: ‘the good consideration rule’ and the ‘legal obligation qualification’.

This thesis argues that the good consideration rule is best explained as an enrichment qualification. The ‘consideration’ provided by the defendant offsets the enrichment received. In net terms, this leaves the defendant in an enrichment-neutral position.

The legal obligation qualification is more difficult to account for. Most academic explanations of this rule are based on the assumption that unjust enrichment is subsidiary to other legal obligations. However, no convincing reasons have been offered to support a general doctrine of subsidiarity in the English law of unjust enrichment. The thesis argues that in order to explain the legal obligation qualification one must ask two principal questions: what are the normative reasons that justify unjust enrichment claims? Does the presence of a countervailing legal entitlement defeat any of these reasons?

In view of the uncertainty relating to the normative justification for unjust enrichment, this thesis uses two prominent theoretical accounts as its framework: the entitlement thesis and corrective justice theory. On either view, it is argued, the legal obligation qualification can be explained by the need to maintain equality between the claimant and the defendant.

The equality explanation has many implications for the operation of the legal obligation qualification. For instance, it confirms that the rule operates by denying primary liability. It is suggested, therefore, that the legal burden on this point must fall on the claimant. More importantly, the justificatory scope of the equality thesis extends to cases that have, thus far, been treated as instances of application of the good consideration rule. For the future, therefore, it is suggested that the language of ‘good consideration’ must be abandoned.

Authors: Kizhakkevalappil, K

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-44ykqanng
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: Good consideration; Enrichment owed; Unjust enrichment; Restitution
• Subjects: Unjust enrichment; Restitution; Law