Journal article
Self-knowledge and embedded operators
- Abstract:
- Queen Anne is dead, and it is a fallacy to substitute a definite description for another designator of the same object in stating the content of someone’s propositional attitudes. The fallacy can take subtle forms, as when Godel’s incompleteness theorems are used to argue against mechanistic views of mind. Some instances of the fallacy exemplify a more general logical phenomenon: the set of principles satisfied by one sentential operator can differ from, and even contradict, the set of principles satisfied by another sentential operator coextensive with the first. These notions will be formally defined. The phenomenon will be explored through a series of example, with particular attention to the misapplication of Godel’s results.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1111/j.0003-2638.1996.00202.x
Authors
- Publisher:
- Blackwell Publishing
- Journal:
- Analysis More from this journal
- Volume:
- 56
- Issue:
- 4
- Pages:
- 202-209
- Publication date:
- 1996-10-01
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1467-8284
- ISSN:
-
0003-2638
- Language:
-
English
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:26c3062e-3990-42ea-8033-36042a5038ce
- Local pid:
-
ora:4082
- Deposit date:
-
2010-08-19
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Tim Williamson
- Copyright date:
- 1996
- Notes:
- The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA, but you may be able to access the article via the publisher copy link on this record page.
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record